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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a fissure in the federal judicial system—between decision
and mandate—through which authority and resources are allowed to slip.
Through this crack in federal procedure, decisions of federal appellate
courts—duly deliberated and justly rendered—are surrendered forever to
the ether of vacatur. Due to the needless separation of the issuance of a
decision from the issuance of the corresponding mandate, federal courts
have created a type of limbo in which decisions may exist for a period of
time before being given full effect and precedential value through
mandate. In this period between decision and mandate, decisions have
been shown to be vulnerable to mootness. That is, decisions are
susceptible to the circumstance of post-decision, pre-mandate mootness
that may ultimately prove fatal to the value of the decision.
To clarify, the term “decision” refers to an appellate court’s opinion
that sets out the legal reasoning for its chosen outcome.1 The term
“mandate,” however, refers to a formal order from an appellate court to a
lower court that constitutes the actual final judgment on the case.2 Both
the decision and the mandate must be issued—id est, filed—before either
takes official effect.3 The subject of this Article is the gap of time after
the issuance of a decision but before the issuance of a mandate—and
what happens when a case is rendered moot during that time.
While federal appellate courts have had rare opportunity to address
the obvious incongruity of such a situation, the Ninth Circuit, in In re
Pattullo,4 attempted to address the issue directly. In Pattullo, the Ninth
Circuit’s response to the post-decision, pre-mandate mootness of an
appeal was to vacate its own decision rendered on the appeal,
eviscerating its own authority and surrendering the value of significant
resources expended in the rendering of that decision.5
The Pattullo result has significant implications for the effective and
efficient rendering of appellate decisions. In Part II of this Article, we
examine the specifics and circumstances of the Pattullo decision. In Part
III, we articulate the significant problems the Pattullo rule poses for the
federal courts system. And in Part IV, we examine alternative
conclusions to Pattullo-type circumstances, ultimately concluding that
the most effective approach to post-decision, pre-mandate mootness is to

1 Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 436, 1125 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “decision” and
“opinion”).
2 Cf. id. at 980 (defining “mandate”).
3 Cf. id. at 850 (defining “issue”).
4 271 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2001).
5 See infra notes 1529 and accompanying text.
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eliminate the interim between decision and mandate—thereby
eliminating the possibility for such a conflict to arise.
II. THE PATTULLO RESULT
In In re Pattullo,6 the Ninth Circuit was presented with what
appeared to be a bankruptcy case typical in both procedure and fact.7
The particular issue presented concerned whether John and Susan
Pattullo, individual debtors, were eligible for Chapter 13 bankruptcy
relief.8 The IRS asserted that because the Pattullos owed more than
$250,000 of unsecured debt, the couple was statutorily precluded from
seeking Chapter 13 protection.9 The Pattullos countered that the IRS was
barred from invoking the statutorily prescribed monetary limits due to
the existence of a prior settlement agreement between the IRS and the
Pattullos, which stipulated that the Pattullos did not possess more than
$250,000 in unsecured debt.10 Ultimately, the Pattullos’ eligibility for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection hinged on whether the IRS’s prior
stipulation had preclusive effect in the couple’s later bankruptcy
proceeding.11 The bankruptcy court ruled that it did, and granted the
Pattullos’ motion for Chapter 13 protection.12 The federal district court
affirmed,13 and the IRS appealed to the Ninth Circuit.14
While the appeal was pending before the Ninth Circuit, the
bankruptcy court dismissed the Pattullos’ underlying Chapter 13
proceeding “because the Pattullos had failed to comply with the
requirements of their Chapter 13 plan.”15 The Ninth Circuit panel that
was considering the IRS’s appeal was not notified of the bankruptcy
court’s dismissal of the Pattullos’ proceeding, and two weeks later it

6

271 F.3d at 898.
See id. at 900 (involving an appeal to the Ninth Circuit of a bankruptcy court’s
decision regarding Chapter 13 relief that had first been appealed to a federal district
court).
8 Id.
9 See id. (noting that the IRS filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 13 proceeding on
the grounds that the Pattullos had over $250,000 in unsecured debt, and that 11 U.S.C. §
109(e) (1997) provides Chapter 13 relief only to those with less than $250,000 in
unsecured debts).
10 See id. (noting that the Pattullos sought summary judgment on the IRS’s motion to
dismiss based on the fact that “[t]he IRS had stipulated to the amount of the Pattullos’
unsecured debts as part of a prior settlement between the Pattullos and the IRS”).
11 See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1997)).
12 In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The bankruptcy court granted
the Pattullos’ motion, concluding that the prior stipulation had preclusive effect.”).
13 See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1997)).
14 Id. (“The IRS appealed [the lower courts’] orders to this court.”).
15 Id.
7
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issued a decision affirming the district court’s holding.16 However, the
Ninth Circuit did not immediately issue a mandate accompanying this
decision.17 Shortly thereafter, the IRS filed a motion to vacate the Ninth
Circuit’s decision and to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the
bankruptcy court’s prior dismissal made the Ninth Circuit appeal moot.18
Upon this motion, the Ninth Circuit found itself in the awkward position
of having learned of the prior dismissal only after having issued a
decision but prior to issuing a mandate.19
The Ninth Circuit correctly observed that, to have jurisdiction over
a case, a court must be able to grant effective relief between parties.20
An appeal to a court lacking such ability is moot.21 The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the IRS that any future mandate it could issue in the case
would fail to grant relief because the underlying Chapter 13 proceeding
had been dismissed—any formal order as to the validity of that
proceeding would be moot.22 Thus, the mandateless Ninth Circuit appeal
was moot.23
In Pattullo, it is clear that mootness stripped the Ninth Circuit of its
jurisdiction to issue a mandate. But the case raises the perplexing
question of how to handle decisions in cases that later become moot
before a mandate is issued. With little precedential support and no
explication, the Ninth Circuit offered this conclusory view: “Even after
an appellate court has issued its decision, if it has not yet issued its
mandate and the case becomes moot, the court will vacate its decision
and dismiss the appeal as moot.”24

16 See id. (explaining that the bankruptcy court dismissed the proceeding on June 27,
2001, and that the Ninth Circuit issued its disposition on July 11, 2001).
17 See id. at 901 (noting that the Pattullo court had “yet to issue [its] mandate” by the
time the IRS informed it about the dismissal of the Chapter 13 proceeding).
18 In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the IRS’s motion to
vacate and dismiss, which was filed two weeks after the Ninth Circuit issued its
decision).
19 See id. at 901 (“[W]hile we issued our memorandum disposition prior to the IRS
bringing to our attention the dismissal of the Pattullos’ Chapter 13 proceeding, we have
yet to issue our mandate.”).
20 See id. (“[W]hile we issued our memorandum disposition prior to the IRS bringing
to our attention the dismissal of the Pattullos’ Chapter 13 proceeding, we have yet to
issue our mandate.”).
21 See id. (“Our mootness inquiry focuses upon whether we can still grant relief
between the parties.”).
22 See id. at 902 (“Because the Chapter 13 proceeding has been dismissed, any ruling
as to its validity would be moot.”).
23 See id. (dismissing the case as moot in light of the bankruptcy court’s dismissal).
24 In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 90102 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Miller,
685 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)). The Pattullo court’s support for this
proposition is discussed in great depth in Part III. A., infra.
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Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the merits of the
Pattullos’ case was vacated, and the IRS’s appeal was dismissed.25 By
vacating its own decision, the Ninth Circuit avoided the thorny issues
inherent in post-decision, pre-mandate mootness by creating a
superficially sound rule.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH PATTULLO
By addressing the post-decision, pre-mandate mootness issue in
such a manner, the Pattullo court set a clear and strict rule: When a case
becomes moot after a decision is issued but before a mandate is issued,
the decision shall be vacated.26 While the Pattullo court’s vacatur of its
own decision seems to have been a reasonable method by which to
resolve the problems posed by post-judgment, pre-mandate mootness, the
likelihood for appropriate application of such a method across any
spectrum of similar cases is slim.
The effects of such a decision are apparent: A vacated decision has
no precedential effect,27 is in essence reversed,28 and is effectively
stripped of all persuasive authority.29 For any decision that may become
moot before an accompanying mandate is issued, the Pattullo treatment
is utterly fatal. However, such treatment is potentially problematic for
various legal and policy reasons, and is not the most desirable in light of
our modern court structure or any number of traditional judicial
ambitions.
A. The Pattullo Decision Lacks Precedential Support
The rule suggested by Pattullo is unsupported in case law. A close
study of the authority offered by the Ninth Circuit in support of the
Pattullo rule indicates that there is, in fact, no precedent requiring
25 See id. at 902 (“We lack jurisdiction over this case and must accordingly vacate
our memorandum disposition and dismiss this appeal.”).
26 See id. at 90102.
27 Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] decision
that has been vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever.”).
28 See, e.g., DOROTHY W. NELSON, ET AL., FEDERAL NINTH CIRCUIT CIVIL APPELLATE
PRACTICE 10:262 (“[T]he effect of reversal and vacatur is essentially the same and the
court occasionally uses the terms interchangeably.”). Compare Cal. Dept. of Soc. Servs.
v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir. 2003) (using reversal to nullify the lower
court’s decision), with Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004) (using
vacatur to render the district court’s ruling null).
29 See, e.g., Russman v. Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 114, 122 n.2 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating
that the persuasive authority of a federal court’s order is lost if that order is vacated); Jo
Ann J. Brighton, et al., Yellowstone: New Standards for Lender Ability in Today’s
Economic Climate, 287 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 84 (2009) (noting that a landmark
bankruptcy case was no longer persuasive authority after being vacated).
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vacatur of a decision unaccompanied by a mandate in the event that the
underlying case becomes moot.30
The Pattullo court’s grand claim that post-decision, pre-mandate
mootness requires vacatur of a decision is supported by a single citation
referencing United States v. Miller31—a tax fraud case arising from the
Former Fifth Circuit.32 However, the laconic Miller opinion does little to
shed light on what should be done with decisions unaccompanied by
mandate that later become moot. In Miller, as in Pattullo, the underlying
case became moot after the federal circuit court issued its opinion on the
presented appeal, but before it issued an accompanying mandate.33 After
simply stating that “the instant case has . . . become moot,” the Miller
court held that the “previous opinion of this court . . . is vacated.”34
However, like the Pattullo court, the Miller court offers little basis for
why such an opinion must be vacated. The Miller court cites as its sole
guidance United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,35 a 1950 Supreme Court
case.36
While the authoritative trail in support of the Pattullo rule ends
with the sexagenarian Munsingwear, the Munsingwear opinion does not
actually support a rule requiring vacatur of mandateless decisions in
cases that become moot, as provided in Pattullo and Miller. The relevant
portion of Munsingwear merely states,
The established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case
from a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its
way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the
judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.37
Aside from the fact that Munsingwear’s language can be strictly
interpreted to apply only to civil cases before the Supreme Court, even a
broad reading of Munsingwear does not buttress the Pattullo and Miller
rules regarding post-decision, pre-mandate mootness.
At most, Munsingwear establishes merely that a federal appellate
court will vacate (or reverse) a lower court decision and remand to
dismiss if a federal appeal becomes moot while pending a decision
30
31
32

124).

See infra notes 34 to 40.
685 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
See In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 90001 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Miller, 685 F.2d at

33 See Miller, 685 F.2d at 124 (noting that the appeal was rendered moot “[b]efore
issuance of the mandate in the instant case,” but after a previous opinion was published at
660 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)).
34 Id.
35 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
36 See Miller, 685 F.2d at 124 (citing Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 36).
37 Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39.
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before the appellate court. Contrary to what the Miller and Pattullo
courts assert, Munsingwear contemplates neither mootness arising after a
federal appellate court has issued its decision, nor the proper role of the
Furthermore, Munsingwear does not discuss the
mandate.38
circumstance of a federal court vacating its own decision in the face of
mootness—its consideration is limited to the vacatur of a prior lower
court decision. Consequently, even the most generous reading of
Munsingwear fails to provide precedential support for Pattullo’s harshly
strict result requiring vacatur of mandateless decisions once their cases
have become moot. And because the precedent asserted as support for
the Pattullo and Miller holdings is flimsy at best (and completely lacking
at worst), the validity of the conclusions reached by these two courts
regarding post-decision, pre-mandate mootness must be seriously
questioned.
B. The Pattullo Result Allows Parties to Negate the Exercise of Judicial
Authority
Pattullo’s conclusion that issued decisions must be vacated in the
event the underlying case becomes moot presents another significant
issue for the federal judicial system. It could allow parties to shortcircuit the decision-making process, thereby permitting parties—and not
federal judges—to shape law. Such a result is offensive to traditionallyheld values relating to the law generally and the form and function of the
judiciary specifically.
Federal courts are endowed with a certain power to say what the
law is.39 Federal courts are comprised of federal judges who rise to their
office only through the successful navigation of an oftentimes rigorous,
constitutionally-mandated nomination and confirmation process.40 This
appointment process, which is at the same time both a pillar and
reflection of certain constitutionally-valued principles, has endured little
deviation since our country’s inception. This is a carefully crafted
process which aspires to do no less than to safeguard justice by reserving
the powers of judicial review, statutory interpretation, and the like, to a

38

See id. (including no mention of mandates or post-decision mootness).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
40 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (detailing the nomination and approval process of
Supreme Court judges); Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)), extended by the Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch.
448, 39 Stat. 726 (creating the circuit courts of appeals and detailing the method of
appointing circuit judges).
39
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select few anointed by elected federal representatives.41 However, the
Pattullo result permits the usurpation of those powers by parties who
find the result of an appropriately undertaken federal judicial proceeding
to be potentially adverse.
Consider the following hypothetical: Alpha Co. sues Beta Co. in
federal court. Alpha wins. Beta appeals a determination of law made by
the district court. The federal circuit court executes a diligent review—it
receives briefs, hears oral argument, and undertakes all reasonable and
regular deliberation of the issues. The circuit court ultimately issues a
decision affirming the lower court’s determination of law, but does not
immediately issue an accompanying mandate that formally orders the
result stated in the decision. Importantly, the circuit court’s decision
interprets the applicable law in a manner that both Alpha and Beta feel to
be potentially adverse to the parties’ long-term interests. Alpha and Beta
are both repeat players in federal courts, and because both parties are
likely to litigate similar issues in the future, it is in neither party’s longterm interest to see the circuit court’s disfavored interpretation of law
become binding precedent. For that reason, Alpha and Beta execute a
settlement intended to render—and effectively rendering—the
underlying case moot.42 Before the circuit can issue a mandate in the
case, it notices that Alpha and Beta no longer have a case or controversy
for which the circuit can grant effective relief. Per Pattullo, the circuit
court dismisses Beta v. Alpha as moot and vacates its own decision
regarding the applicable law.
The result of this hypothetical is unfortunate. Alpha and Beta have
effectively usurped the authority of the circuit court by deciding whether
or not the circuit’s interpretation of applicable law will stand as valid
precedent or be erased from case law by vacatur. The parties received a
preview of the precedent that will ultimately bind them, and then seized
upon an opportunity to eliminate the precedential threat. In effect, the
parties have exercised a veto of forthcoming federal case law. Parties—
not judges—have determined legal precedent.
41 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (noting that federal judges are confirmed by
elected federal representatives).
42 There may be some cases that fall into exceptions of the mootness doctrine, but
there will be some that do not. See 15 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.99 (3d ed.2009)
(detailing the exceptions to mootness and characterizing them as narrow). Moreover,
crafty parties acting in consort may be able to conceal that the case is not properly
characterized as moot. As an aside, note that the amount of the settlement will depend on
the value assigned by Alpha and Beta, respectively, to avoiding precedent at issue. And
although Alpha will win the immediate case by not settling, it will nevertheless settle
when the long-term cost of the disfavored precedent exceeds the short-term gain from the
immediate verdict.
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A thorough discussion of why such a rule is constitutionally
questionable or consequentially dangerous is grist for a different mill. It
is sufficient to note the apparent disharmony of this outcome with
existing notions of federal judicial power. Litigating parties, unlike
federal judges, have not been subjected to selective nomination,
confirmation, and appointment processes designed to reserve judicial
authority to a narrow class. They were not chosen by elected
representatives to interpret the law of the land with the advisement and
consent of other similarly selected individuals. Thus, endowing parties
with what amounts to a veto power over forthcoming precedent runs
contrary to the constitutionally mandated structure of our federal
judiciary. The Pattullo rule, in some sense, could at times elevate parties
to a position where they enjoy co-equal power with the federal appellate
bench. Consequently, the Pattullo rule is constitutionally questionable
because it allows federal law to be vetoed by persons and corporations
who are not appropriately vested—constitutionally or statutorily—with
the power to determine federal law.
The negative consequences of Pattullo-enabled party vetoes of
federal law are easily foreseeable. Private individuals and corporations,
under the Pattullo rule, could essentially ratify or veto precedent to avoid
judicial outcomes against their self-interest. This has several adverse
results. For instance, it stunts the growth of federal legal precedent, the
law will take a shape that best accommodates the desires of savvy repeat
litigants without regard for judicial intent or non-repeat players, and the
strength of statutory law will atrophy as such laws are shaped by
strategic precedent derailment. This last point is particularly troubling
for those concerned about popular expression given the fact that, in our
democratic system, popular expression is entrusted to elected
representatives, whose subsequent expression is partially manifested in
statutory law. However, as noted, the problems with allowing nonjudges to determine federal law are too obvious and too abundant to fully
address in this limited space.
Finally, it is important to recognize that a post-decision, premandate settlement is but one of many ways in which federal judicial
impotence might occur given the Pattullo rule. For example—local rules
permitting—Alpha might withdraw its original complaint,43 or Beta
might withdraw its appeal.44 Any such scenario could result in the

43 See, e.g., Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 200–01 (1988) (holding that
respondents’ withdrawal of their complaints rendered the appeal moot).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Radin, 865 F.2d 266, 266 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Because
[defendant] has withdrawn his appeal, this issue is now moot as to him.”).
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usurpation of federal judicial power by savvy parties with a view towards
the long term.
C. The Pattullo Result Precipitates a Waste of Judicial Resources
Judicial resources are scarce.45 Accordingly, wasting judicial
resources is discouraged.46 Academic proposals to conserve judicial
resources abound,47 and numerous legal standards recognize the value of
limited judicial assets.48 Pattullo’s result dictating that post-decision,
pre-mandate mootness requires vacatur of the decision results in a
massive waste of judicial resources by inappropriately erasing a decision
reached through the significant expenditure of judicial resources. Thus,
even as a policy matter, the Pattullo rule is vulnerable to meaningful
criticism.
Any time an appeal is dismissed as moot after a decision has been
issued—without regard to whether or not the mootness results from the
intentional derailment of disfavored precedent—a significant amount of
judicial resources is spent.49 The entire value of the time, work, and
expense consumed in considering the appeal and reaching a decision is
lost. This is an unfortunate but unavoidable feature of our federal courts
system and the mootness doctrine. However, what is not necessary—and
what is certainly not unavoidable—is the vacatur of a mandateless
decision in a case that later becomes moot.
The establishment of precedent is the value received in exchange
for the expenditure of scarce judicial resources. Having received that
precedent, our legal landscape is endowed with some measure of clarity
45 See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2567–68 (2010) (describing “judicial
resources” as “scarce”); Kenyeres v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1301, 1388 (2003) (noting the
scarcity of judicial resources).
46 See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 337 n.24
(2005) (expressing the “desire to conserve judicial resources.”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731–32 (2002) (noting, in passing, that
conservation of judicial resources is desirable).
47 See, e.g., Bruce Zucker & Michelle Carey, Capturing the Harm: Defining “Tax
Loss” for Use in Federal Sentencing, 15 AKRON TAX J. 1, 15 (2000) (advocating for a
federal sentencing policy that will conserve judicial resources); Elizabeth Fella, Note,
Playing Catch Up: Changing the Bankruptcy Code to Accommodate America’s Growing
Number of Non-Traditional Couples, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 704 (2005) (proposing a
change to the bankruptcy code because, in part, it “will conserve judicial resources”).
48 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (limiting the
applicability of precedent regarding qualified immunity because, in part, it “sometimes
results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources”); Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (noting federal courts’ implementation of a procedural
rule intended to conserve judicial resources).
49 See Daniel A. Zariski, et al., Mootness in the Class-Action Context, 26 REV. LITIG.
77, 112 (2007) (discussing how allowing a party to moot a named plaintiff’s claim, and
thereby avoid class certification, at the last moment wastes judicial and party resources).
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and guidance for the resolution of future disputes.50 When a court
vacates a decision, it completely strips that decision of precedential
effect.51 It is unable to provide clarity or guidance to any legal actor,52
and the accompanying loss of judicial resources is a sunk cost. Vacatur
prevents the precedents that (in part) validate the use of judicial
resources.
Accordingly, it is clear that a desire to prevent the injudicious
consumption of judicial resources is further ground to harshly consider
the Pattullo result. An avoidance of vacatur would therefore serve policy
interests as well as the legal interests previously discussed.53
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PATTULLO RULE
As discussed above, the Pattullo rule regarding post-decision, premandate mootness is unsupported by case law and unsupportable in the
face of certain legal and policy arguments. Fortunately, there are a
number of alternative ways in which courts may address post-decision,
pre-mandate mootness without vacating the decision and running
contrary to the previously articulated interests.
The approaches
described herein certainly do not represent the entire universe of
available alternatives to the Pattullo rule, but they are surely among the
most intuitive. Furthermore, having surveyed many of the alternatives

50 In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“When a clash between genuine adversaries produces a precedent, however, the judicial
system ought not allow the social value of that precedent, created at cost to the public and
other litigants, to be a bargaining chip in the process of settlement. The precedent, a
public act of a public official, is not the parties’ property.”). See also Donald G. Gifford,
Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 790 (2003)
(“In the common law system, past precedents—albeit interpreted in light of changing
current social and economic conditions—should guide courts as they undertake to bring
clarity to . . . the law.”); see also Darlene C. Goring, Private Problem, Public Solution:
Affirmative Action in the 21st Century, 33 AKRON L. REV. 209, 286–87 (2000) (noting
that “Supreme Court precedent . . . offer[s] guidance” on race-based remedial affirmative
action programs); Jeffrey M. Olson, Note, Gauging an Adequate Probable Cause
Standard for Provisional Arrest in Light of Parretti v. United States, 48 CATH. U. L. REV.
161, 202 (1998) (noting that legal precedent provides great clarity on the topic of the
Constitution’s applicability in certain international law enforcement scenarios).
51 Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] decision
that has been vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever.”).
52 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
53 This position also finds support in Humphreys v. DEA, where the Third Circuit
chose not to vacate a decision given the existing absence of case law on the topic at issue.
105 F.3d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In light of the complete absence of case law
interpreting the relevant statute, we believe it would not be prudent to withdraw our
opinion.”). See also Part III. A.–B., supra.
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and explored the contours of our federal courts system, it appears that
these are also among the most viable.
A. Permit the Decision to Stand as Valid Precedent
Perhaps the most obvious alternative to the Pattullo result is to
permit a federal court’s decision to stand as valid precedent even though
the underlying case became moot prior to the issue of an accompanying
mandate. This would endow the decision with full precedential force
despite the dismissal of the underlying case as moot and no issue of a
subsequent mandate. This alternative would necessarily view the
decision as having significance independent from the mandate. That is,
the decision is not dependent upon the issuance of an accompanying
mandate for precedential value. This is precisely what the Third Circuit
did in Humphreys v. DEA, an appeal involving the post-decision, premandate death of the appellant54
This alternative proposal has potential pitfalls. Most notably, it is
of questionable constitutionality, in part because federal courts are barred
from issuing advisory opinions and other such decisions where a genuine
dispute is absent.55 Of course, this alternative would not permit the
issuance of advisory opinions per se because the decisions in question
would have been issued at times when true cases or controversies were
before the deciding federal courts.
However, these decisions
nevertheless apply to ultimately moot cases, and it is not clear if the fact
of their premature issuance should save them from vacatur or some like
fate.
Contrariwise, if the jurisdictional minefield could be successfully
navigated and this alternative was considered constitutional, then a
decent argument could be made in support of this alternative.
Specifically, an objector to this alternative would be hard-pressed to
offer meaningful reasons against permitting the decision to stand as
precedent. The decision, despite mootness, is the product of the same
rigor, deliberation, and litigation as any other precedential decision.
Consequently, it is reasonable to assert that such a decision merits as
54

105 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1996).
“[C]ourts should not render decisions absent a genuine need to resolve a real
dispute.” 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3532.1, at 114 (2d ed. 1984). This principle is an
invocation of the doctrine of ripeness, and regarding ripeness the Supreme Court has said
that the ripeness doctrine is “drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power
and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park Hospitality
Ass’n v. Dep’t of The Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807 (2003) (citing Reno v. Catholic Soc.
Servs., Inc. 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (internal quotations omitted)).
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much authority as any other case decided by the same court at the same
time in the same way.
Ultimately, in light of itsquestionable constitutionality, permitting
mandateless decisions in cases that later become moot to enjoy full
precedential authority is perhaps not the best alternative to the Pattullo
rule. More conservative and less problematic alternatives exist.
B. Deem the Decision Non-Precedential Without Vacatur
A second alternative to the Pattullo rule requiring vacatur of a
decision lacking an accompanying mandate in instances where the
underlying case has become moot is to deem the decision nonprecedential without requiring vacatur. That is, federal appellate courts
could issue an order stating that the previously issued decision “lacks
precedential value” and “cannot be cited as authority.”56 By such an
order, the opinion would not stand as binding precedent. Accordingly,
the constitutional concerns raised by advisory opinions and the like may
be further lessened, though perhaps not completely silenced.57
The difference between this alternative and the Pattullo rule may
not be readily apparent, but it is critical nonetheless: A non-precedential
decision—known in some jurisdictions as a memorandum opinion58—
may provide valuable guidance to future parties and judicial actors
despite its character as non-binding precedent.59 Parties may look to
non-precedential decisions to better understand the factual circumstances
that have historically led a particular court to particular outcomes. Put
simply, decisions have value though they may be non-binding. Courts
can avoid a needless waste of judicial resources by giving mandateless
decision in cases later rendered moot a status akin to that held by
memorandum opinions. Because such decisions have value even though
56 See, e.g., MJG Enters. v. Cloyd, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102579, at *21 n.1 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 27, 2010) (explaining that “a de-published opinion has no precedential effect
and cannot be cited as authority in any court”); see also, e.g., Payne v. Peninsula Sch.
Dist., 621 F.3d 1001, 1001 (9th Cir. 2010) (ordering that Payne be taken en banc, and
that the three-judge panel decision “shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of
the Ninth Circuit”).
57 See supra notes 55 and 56 and accompanying text. The concerns are lessened
because the resulting opinion would have been issued when there was a live case or
controversy, it would not bind the parties as their case is already moot, and it would not
have precedential effect. That being said, the concerns may not be wholly eliminated. If a
case becomes mooted before the decision is issued, courts cannot then release a
memorandum opinion; that would still be an advisory opinion. Therefore, one may object
that the memorandum opinion here applies to an ultimately moot case and therefore, like
the “binding opinion” alternative discussed in Part IV.A. supra, it is also of questionable
constitutionality.
58 See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING § 2.4.2.
59 Id.
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they are non-binding, this alternative is preferable to erasing such
decisions from judicial history via vacatur. It also aids in ensuring that
judge-written law remains a resource for legal actors—and mutes the
power of parties to dictate or veto federal law. Though this seems like a
viable solution, in light of the lingering constitutional concerns, we think
a better solution remains.
C. Require Simultaneous Issuance of Decisions and Mandates
The best alternative to the Pattullo rule is simply to require federal
appellate courts to issue decisions simultaneously with accompanying
mandates. This would altogether eliminate the lag between the issuance
of the decision and the issuance of the mandate. Accordingly, it would
be impossible for a case to become moot in the interim between the
issuance of the decision and the issuance of the mandate. The Pattullo
problem could be avoided entirely, rather than ham-handedly remedied.
Presently, the main reason for the failure to issue decisions
simultaneously with accompanying mandates is to allow for a petition for
rehearing.60 Beyond that, sheer bureaucratic inefficiency is a likely
contributor to the problem. Neither provides a compelling rationale for
needlessly exposing the decision-making process to the type of
awkwardness and confusion illustrated by Pattullo and Miller. Regarding
the allowance for rehearing, courts could issue the mandate
simultaneously with the decision, and simply recall the mandate if
rehearing is required.61 Thus, any interim between decision and mandate
is without justifiable motivation.
Because the requirement that courts issue decisions simultaneously
with accompanying mandates is novel, it is unclear what undesirable
effect might result from such a rule, if any. Perhaps such a requirement
would have the unintended consequence of slowing the federal appellate
process. Perhaps such a requirement would increase the already
substantial costs of justice-seeking by creating additional administrative
burdens for the justice system to bear. However, these hypothetical
concerns seem nominal and, particularly in light of the structural and
policy concerns articulated above,62 well worth the anticipated benefits.
60

FED. R. APP. P. 41 (“The court’s mandate must issue 7 days after the time to file a
petition for rehearing expires, or 7 days after entry of an order denying a timely petition
for panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for stay of mandate,
whichever is later. The court may shorten or extend the time.”).
61
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 expressly allows the court to shorten the time
period between decision and mandate. FED. R. APP. P. 41. Moreover, courts commonly
recall their mandates for a variety of reasons.
62 See Part III, supra.
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In sum, the best way of handling post-decision, pre-mandate
mootness is to prevent it from happening altogether. The creation of
federal statutory or court rules requiring that federal appellate courts
issue mandates simultaneously with decisions could avoid potential
Pattullo- and Miller-like situations. This would accordingly eliminate
the power of litigating parties to usurp judicial authority by
manufacturing mootness in the face of disfavored precedent. It would
also eliminate the obvious waste resulting from the vacatur of alreadyrendered decisions. Therefore, by following this path, our federal courts
could avoid the adverse consequences resulting from Pattullo.
V. CONCLUSION
In Pattullo, the Ninth Circuit held that “[e]ven after an appellate
court has issued its decision, if it has not yet issued its mandate and the
case becomes moot, the court will vacate its decision and dismiss the
appeal as moot.”63 This unsupported assertion appears to have ignored
any reasonable calculation of the potential effects such a result might
have in the aggregate and in different situations. The Pattullo rule
allows the evisceration of circuit authority in favor of the precedential
preference of the litigating parties and precipitates a gross waste of
judicial resources. In short, this rule exacerbates a procedural wrinkle in
our federal courts system, and it ought to be replaced.
The most effective and intuitive alternative to the Pattullo rule
would be a federal statutory or court rule requiring that accompanying
mandates be issued simultaneously with their decisions. Such a rule
would avoid the negative consequence of a Pattullo- or Miller-type
situation by eliminating the foolish inconsistency of separating decision
from mandate. And in doing so, such a rule would create a more
complete relationship between mandate and decision that even the most
cunning of litigants would be hard-pressed to tear asunder.

63 Id. at 90102 (citing United States v. Miller, 685 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. Unit B
1982). The Pattullo court’s support for this proposition is discussed in great depth in Part
III. A., supra.

